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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Great strides have been made recently in the theoretical approach to quantifying non-tariff barriers. Modifying an 
approach proposed by Novy (2013), this note attempts to understand the extent of non-tariff barriers between Ukraine 
and its major trading partners in goods. By fashioning a new approach to trade in services as well, I provide the first 
comprehensive estimates of ad valorem equivalents of the non-tariff measures that exist in Ukraine. 
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Quantifying Non-Tariff Barriers in Ukraine: A Comprehensive Trade Cost Approach 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
With the prospect of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) between Ukraine and the EU 
becoming more likely, a major question for policymakers is the effect this agreement would have on the Ukrainian 
economy. Before such a question can be answered, however, there needs to be an understanding of the barriers that 
currently exist in Ukraine that can stifle trade, in particular the extensive web of non-tariff barriers. Unfortunately, 
there is very little quantification done to date on the ad valorem equivalents (AVE) of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in 
reference to Ukraine apart from Movchan and Shportyuk (2008). The purpose of this note is to rectify this omission, 
utilizing new theoretical advances in the quantification of non-tariff barriers to examine the NTBs between Ukraine 
and its major trading partners: Russia, Turkey, the EU, the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA), and the rest of the world.  
 
II. Methodology and Data 
 
Great strides have been made recently in the theoretical approach to quantifying non-tariff barriers. A strategy for 
estimating NTBs in goods was proposed by Novy (2013), who utilize a geometric average of trade costs to determine 
barriers unrelated to tariffs; in their estimation, NTBs also would include “all additional costs other than tariff costs 
involved in trading goods bilaterally rather than domestically” (Hayakawa and Kimura 2014: 6).  The Hayakawa and 
Kimura (2014) approach utilizes trade costs structured as: 
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Where τ is the comprehensive trade costs between countries I and j, t are the trade costs between the countries, and 
x are the consumption of products (or value of products traded) from country to country or within the country (and 𝜎 is 
the elasticity of substitution).  
 
In this previous work (including Mirodout et. al 2012), the average of tariff rates was utilized to create a picture of 
comprehensive trading costs that existed between two bilateral partners. As we are interested primarily in asymmetric 
effects, we instead calculate TRij as: 
 
(2) 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗 =  1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗  
 
NTBs can then be calculated at a tariff-equivalent basis as: 
 
(3) 𝑁𝑇𝐵𝑖𝑗 = 100 ∗ (
1+(𝜏𝑖𝑗 100)⁄
𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗
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For this analysis, the tariff calculations for goods, shown in equation (2), are done using the World Bank’s World 
Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) database by specific Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) sector. For broader 
aggregates, tariff rates were calculated as the simple average of the simple average; for example, the tariff rate for 
wheat, paddy rice, and vegetables were averaged to give a tariff rate for agriculture. Similarly, in multi-country 
groupings (such as the European Union), these aggregated averages were further averaged across countries.  
 
For this exercise, as in Hayakawa and Kimura (2014), the trade costs were directly obtained from the ESCAP-World 
Bank Trade Cost Database for 2012 (the most recent year available). As the comprehensive trade cost is computed 
already, utilizing an elasticity of substitution (𝜎 in equation 1 above) of 8 for all sectors, it would require extensive 
production data far beyond the scope of this note to create a scenario model of different elasticities. However, the 
chosen elasticity follows from a long line of econometric modelling of trade data: Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) 
survey estimates of the elasticity and conclude that it normally is between 5 to 10, while Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
find the baseline estimate of the elasticity as 8.3. Novy (2013) utilized 8 as his baseline, and concludes that 
aggregate trade flows are “not sensitive to this particular value.”  
 
This methodology is then utilized to examine the NTBs to and from Ukraine in a variety of sectors (the mapping of 
sectors from the World Bank GTAP database to our aggregations is based on work done previously for the European 
Commission (Ecorys-CASE (2007)). But while this methodology is suitable for trade in goods, unfortunately it is 
unable to encompass trade in services. Quantifications of NTBs in trade in services has followed a more standardized 
methodology, spearheaded by the World Bank (notably Jaffari and Tarr 2014). This approach encompasses the 
construction of a trade restrictiveness index (TRI), based on survey methods, to map out the amount of restrictions in 
a given services sector. To convert this TRI into an ad valorem equivalent, an econometric estimate of elasticity of 
substitution, derived from a gravity equation specific to each sector, is utilized and inserted into the following equation 
(based on Anderson and Wincoop 2003): 
 
(4) 𝐴𝑉𝐸 = 100 ∗ 𝑒𝜎∗𝑇𝑅𝐼 − 1 
 
Jaffari and Tarr (2014) have derived a series of AVEs for NTBs in services for 103 countries over 11 sectors utilizing 
the World Bank’s Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI) and a series of sector weights pulled from the 
extensive trade literature. In this paper, we utilize their data for Ukraine and Ukraine’s trade partners, with some 
changes. In the first instance, they have their estimates done by country, so in the case of multi-country groupings 
such as the EU or Eurasian Customs Union, we perform an average of their estimates across countries. Secondly 
and similarly, their estimates by sector need to be aggregated to map to our broader sectors (for example, combining 
rail and maritime transport), and this is also done using a simple averaging.  
 
A more nefarious issue is in regards to missing countries and sectors. Jaffari and Tarr have no data for the EFTA 
countries (Switzerland, Iceland, and Norway) or some of the EU-28 countries, which corresponds to gaps in the 
World Bank’s STRI database. To overcome this issue for the EU, the numbers shown as NTBs in services are the 
average of all the EU countries for which data is available.
1
 In order to fill in the gaps for the EFTA countries, 
however, we utilize the STRI from the OECD, which has coverage for the EFTA countries, paired with Jaffari and 
Tarr’s (2014) sector weightings to generate AVEs for the non-tariff barriers in services in these countries.
2
  
 
Finally, and perhaps most difficult, Jaffari and Tarr also do not have estimates available for the construction or social 
activities sectors. To overcome this sizeable obstacle, we base the elasticities on previous literature. Utilizing 
Francois’s (1999) approach, we set the elasticity of the construction service sector at 0.4, reflecting its greater 
immobility and lower sensitivity to prices in the aggregate. This generates results for nearly every country/grouping in 
                                                          
1
 The missing countries are Croatia, Cyprus, Latvia, Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
2
 The only sector that this did not work for was communications, which had no weighting that could be obtained: the original weighting estimated by 
Jaffari and Tarr was based on country-specific information that is not available for the EFTA countries.  
our sample, except for Ukraine, which is excluded from the OECD STRI. For this, we rely on an estimate from Kee et. 
al (2009) of the average service trade restrictiveness of 0.421 for Ukraine; this number comports closely with the 
OECD STRI of Russia, which is 0.31 for the construction industry, as well as the estimates from Castajon et. al 
(2008), who find that barriers to foreign ownership in the construction industry average out across all countries to an 
elasticity of 0.4238.
3
  
 
In regards to recreation, there are simply no international comparisons available, forcing us to be even more creative. 
The OECD STRI has coverage for the category “motion pictures,” which was the subject of a gravity study by Hanson 
and Xiang (2009); their work found a trade barrier elasticity of 0.268, which we utilize here in combination with the 
OECD-provided STRI. As above, where there is no data available on TRIs (as with Ukraine and the ECU), we 
substitute Kee et. al’s (2009) country-wide averages.  
 
III. Results 
 
A detailed explanation of the results for trade in goods by partner is shown in Table 1. The first column shows the 
total trade cost between Ukraine and its partners (as in Novy’s (2013) formulation), which the second and third 
column show the asymmetric effect of trade barriers from Ukraine’s side or that of the partner in 2012. As can be 
seen, the variation across goods is quite high; to take the example of trade with Turkey, dairy products face very little 
barriers but the cow itself showing barriers of over 100%! The broad results from the NTBs in goods comport with 
Movchan and Shportyuk (2008), and, in general, the level of protection estimated for Ukraine appears to be realistic, 
especially in the higher levels of NTBs in the agricultural sectors (which have been under restrictive land use 
practices for a decade and a half). Thus, our estimates appear to be supported by prior evidence and historical 
experience. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
An interesting question is how these NTBs in goods have evolved over time. Table 2 shows the same methodology 
applied to data from 2010 and 2011 for the same partner groupings. As can be seen, overall NTBs between Ukraine 
and most of the world have decreased over this three-year span, including with the EU-27, while they have increased 
somewhat with the ECU (in regards to agriculture) and remained fairly steady with Russia.
4
 The only huge 
discrepancy to these trends regards agricultural imports in EFTA in 2010, a number driven by Iceland’s prohibitive 
tariffs on “other crops not elsewhere classified” (which reached a rate of 2,012% that year but was removed the 
following year).  
 
Table 2 here 
 
For services, Table 3 below shows the NTBs in services for all partners to and from Ukraine in 2012. While there is 
little previous work quantifying the NTBs of trade in services in Ukraine, our estimates shown above are in line with 
other estimates of the scale of NTBs globally. For example, Walsh (2006) finds an average tariff equivalent of 72% for 
services measures, while our work shows data more in line with Guillin (2013), who finds a lower average tariff 
equivalent of around 40% across 63 countries.  
 
Table 3 here 
                                                          
3
 Similarly, the ECU number was taken from the average of Belarus and Kazakhstan in the Kee et. al (2009) paper as data for Armenia and Tajikistan 
was not available. Finally, restrictiveness for the rest of the world relied on the 0.4238 elasticity of Castajon et al (2008). 
4
 The EU grouping for 2010 and 2011 does not include Croatia, as membership was not imminent. 
  
IV. Conclusions 
 
This note has offered a quantification of non-tariff barriers in Ukraine, based on the latest trade methodologies. 
Ukraine still shows much more preferential trade towards Russia and the Eurasian Customs Union, and reduction of 
barriers to the EU via a DCFTA may lead to welfare gains in Ukraine. Formally modelling such a scenario has been 
made easier by the quantification shown here. 
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